When it came to the Vietnam War, the Republican Party was in something of a quandary--and Johnson knew it. Republicans in Congress were likely to be the last ones to counsel retreat in the face of Communist aggression. I too was sympathetic to the
Kennedy and Johnson administrations' expressed aims in Vietnam--to check Communist expansion--as were most Americans in the early years of the war.
But I started to have concerns in May 1965, when a Vietnam War appropriation bill came before the
House, and President Johnson urgently requested an additional $700 million for the Department of Defense. The vote turned into a proxy fight between supporters and opponents of the war. In the end,
I voted for the appropriations.
It was clear that the war in Vietnam had become the single most important issue facing the country.
US & USSR invasions differed: we don't covet their land
In 2001, it was a new kind of war. At a press briefing in November, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld deflected speculation that we would suffer the same fate as the Soviets--a long, losing campaign--pointing out that there was a critical difference
between us and communists invaders. "We don't covet their land," he said. Americans were there to crush two sets of Islamic extremists. One had attacked the US and the other was oppressing the Afghan people. Each depended on the other for survival.
Source: Courage and Consequence, by Karl Rove, p.286
, Nov 2, 2010
Replaced Powell’s “Overwhelming Force” with “Less is More”
In Nov. 2001, the Iraq war plan was the chessboard on which Rumsfeld would test, develop, expand & modify his ideas about military transformation. The driving concept was “less is more”--new thinking about a lighter, swifter, smaller force that could do
the job better. Rumsfeld’s blitzkrieg would vindicate his leadership of the Pentagon. He was the main architect, driving the meetings & changes.
An important contrast can be found in the 1991 Gulf War. Powell’s concept was “Go in big & end it quickly.
We could not put the US through another Vietnam.“ The plan to use overwhelming force to guarantee victory became known as the Powell Doctrine.
In 2001, things were different. The two great Pentagon ideas--a new, ”refreshed“ Iraq war plan, as Rumsfeld
called it, and military transformation--converged.
The point of the Iraq war plan was: Get to Baghdad, and fast. It echoed Rumsfeld’s desire--”assume risk.“ The Powell Doctrine of trying to guarantee success was out. Rapid, decisive warfare was in.
Afghanistan was CIA operation; Iraq was his operation
At an NSC meeting the day after the 9/11 attacks, Bush asked what the military could do immediately. Rumsfeld replied, "Very little, effectively." Later that day, Rumsfeld asked Bush, Why shouldn't we go against Iraq, not just al Qaeda? The president put
Rumsfeld off, wanting to focus on Afghanistan, al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden.
The CIA stepped in to fill the void. They could bring to bear all the resources of the intelligence community, combined with US military power and Special Forces, harness the
factional opposition known as the Northern Alliance, defeat the Taliban and close out the al Qaeda sanctuary.
Rumsfeld sat uneasily on the sidelines. At an NSC meeting on October 16, his frustration boiled over. "This is CIA's strategy," he declared.
"They developed the strategy. We're just executing the strategy." Rumsfeld had been humiliated. Never again. The next month, when the president ordered him to look seriously at the Iraq war plan, Rumsfeld made it his personal project. This would be his.
1971: Anti-war advocate: get out of Vietnam quickly
On April 7, 1971, the conversation kept returning to a different topic--namely, what the president, with growing irritation, called "the Rumsfeld problem." Nixon was thinking of getting rid of Donald H. Rumsfeld, the former congressman then serving on
the White House staff. "I think Rumsfeld may not be too long for this world," he said, adding, a few minutes later, "Let's dump him."
The problem was that Rumsfeld was becoming, from Nixon and Kissinger's perspective, a troublesome antiwar advocate.
Increasingly, Rumsfeld had emerged at the center of a small group of administration officials, all of them involved with domestic policy, who were privately questioning in staff meetings why the administration could not move more quickly to end the war.
"They don't know a goddamn thing about foreign policy!" Nixon had exploded earlier. "They're only concerned about, frankly, peace at any price, really. Because all they're concerned with is, well, revenue-sharing and environment and all that."
Legal ban on assassinations limits pursuit of bin Laden
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld hinted that the government has evidence showing there was state sponsorship of last week’s attacks. He said that the campaign against terrorism “will not be quick and it will not be easy”
and that the goal is “to drain the swamp they live in.” He added: “We have a choice, either to change the way we live, which is unacceptable, or to change the way that they live, and we chose the latter.”
Rumsfeld said the legal ban on government-sponsored assassinations restricts what the government can do in its pursuit of bin Laden, who is described as the prime suspect in the attacks. But former president Bill Clinton,
in an interview with NBC News, said the ban should pose no hurdle. The ban applies only to heads of state, not terrorists, he said. “I can assure you we’ve been trying to get Osama bin Laden for the last several years.”
We must apply new thinking lies in [the NATO] Alliance’s ability to address regional conflicts. The Balkans showed that the Alliance needs to upgrade and transform its capabilities. And for that, we need more resources.
Second, it showed that we are most successful when we act together.
President Bush plans to review our involvement in the Balkans, with the hope of maintaining the most appropriate type and scale of involvement. We will not act unilaterally, nor fail
to consult our allies. Of that you can be certain.
When we started in Bosnia, we deployed tens of thousands of heavily armed forces. Today, we still have capable force there, but the mission has changed and the force is appropriately smaller & lighter.
We have made these incremental changes through routine reviews, [and the] process of consultation, of assessment, and change should continue. It is the willingness of nations to act in concert that helps sustain security and strengthen the peace.
Source: Speech to Munich Conference on European Security Policy
, Feb 3, 2001
Expect terrorists to get bio, chem, & nuke weapons
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld warned today that he expected the enemies of the US would eventually help terrorist groups obtain chemical, biological and possibly even nuclear weapons technology. His remarks echoed other administration officials
who have stepped up warnings on the spread of chemical and biological weapons, the threat of attacks against Americans overseas and the need for stronger antiterrorism measures at home.
Rumsfeld said, “It doesn’t take a leap of imagination to expect
that at some point those nations will work with those terrorist networks and assist them in achieving and obtaining those kinds of capabilities.“ Rumsfeld did not name those terrorist-supporting nations. But a Department of Defense report released
in January said that Iraq, Iran, Syria, Sudan and Libya all have active chemical or biological weapons programs. In addition, Iraq and Iran are trying to acquire materials for nuclear devices, the report said.
2001: Counseled attacking Iraq at same time as Afghanistan
In Sept. 2001, we considered confronting Iraq as well as the Taliban. Before 9/11, Saddam Hussein's brutal dictatorship was widely considered the most dangerous country in the world."Dealing with Iraq would show a major commitment to antiterrorism," Don
Colin cautioned against it. "We would lose the UN, the Islamic countries, and NATO. If we want to do Iraq, we should do it at a time of our choosing. But we should not do it now, because we don't have linkage to this event."
Cheney understood the threat of Saddam Hussein and believed we had to address it. "But now is not a good time to do it," he said.
I welcomed the vigorous debate. Listening to the discussion and divergent views helped clarify my options. Unless
I received definitive evidence tying Saddam Hussein to the 9/11 plot, I would work to resolve the Iraq problem diplomatically. The best way to show him we were serious was to succeed in Afghanistan.
2004: Remaining violence is thugs & pockets of dead-enders
"Pockets of dead-enders are trying to reconstitute. Gen. Franks and his team are rooting them out." --Donald Rumsfeld, 6/18/03
"Any remaining violence is due to thugs, gangs, and terrorists." --Rumsfeld, 3/14/04
"There are some who feel that
the conditions are such that hey can attack us there. My answer is, bring 'em on. We've got the force necessary to deal with the security situation." --George W. Bush, 7/2/03
"You know, the country is basically peaceful." --Paul Bremer, 9/24/03
Source: The War in Quotes, by G.B. Trudeau, p. 62-65
, Oct 1, 2008
2002: "Iraq has WMDs"; 2003: We never said Iraq had nukes
"The war against terrorism is a new kind of war. In my judgment, this new paradigm renders obsolete Geneva's strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners and renders quaint some of its provisions." --Alberto Gonzales, memo to Pres. Bush, Jan.
"To be considered torture, techniques must produce lasting psychological damage or suffering 'equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death.' " --
Justice Dept. memo, 1/9/02
"Geneva does not apply to our conflict with al-Qaeda; al-Qaeda detainees also do not qualify as prisoners of war." --George W. Bush, memo, 2/7/02
"I stand 8-10 hours a day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours?" --Donal
Rumsfeld, on an interrogation technique memo, 2002
"Congress doesn't have the power to tie the president's hands in regard to torture as an interrogation technique. They can't prevent the president from ordering torture." --Justice Dept. memo, 2005
2003: Several hundred thousand troops is far off the mark
"Something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers." --Gen. Eric Shinseki, on how many troops would be needed in Iraq, testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Feb. 25, 2003
"We can say with reasonable confidence that the
notion of hundreds of thousands of American troops is way off the mark." --Paul Wolfowitz, Feb. 27, 2003
"The idea that it would take several hundred thousand US forces I think is far off the mark." -- Donald Rumsfeld,
Feb. 28, 2003
"We don't have enough troops. We don't control the terrain." --Colin Powell, to George W. Bush and Tony Blair, Nov. 12, 2004
"In my weeks in Iraq,
I did not meet a single military officer who felt, privately, that we had enough troops." --Coalition Provisional Authority adviser Larry Diamond, in a memo to Condoleezza Rice, April 26, 2004
2003: We know where WMDs are, around Tikrit & Baghdad
"As this operation continues, those WMDs will be identified and found, along with the people who produced them and who guard them." --Gen. Tommy Franks, March 22, 2003
"We know where they are. They are in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad." --
Donald Rumsfeld, March 30, 2003
"We know that the regime has them; we know that as the regime collapses we will be led to them." --Tony Blair, April 8, 2003
"We have high confidence that they have weapons of mass destruction. This is what this war
was about and is about." --Ari Fleischer, April 10, 2003
"We are learning more as we interrogate Iraqi scientists and people within the Iraqi structure, that perhaps he destroyed some, perhaps he dispersed some. And so we will find them." --
George W. Bush, April 24, 2003
"We will find them. It'll be a matter of time to do so." --George W. Bush, May 3, 2003.
"I expected them to be found. I still expect them to be found." --Gen Michael Hagee, Marine Corps commander, May 21, 2003
"You're going to find Iraqis out cheering American troops." -- Paul Wolfowitz, February 23, 2003 "There is no question but that they would be welcomed." -- Donald Rumsfeld, February 20, 2003 "My belief is we will,
in fact, be greeted as liberators." -- Dick Cheney, March 16, 2003 "Given the chance to throw off a brutal dictator like Saddam Hussein, people will rejoice." -- Ari Fleischer, March 21, 2003
Source: The War in Quotes, by G.B. Trudeau, p. 47
, Oct 1, 2008
2002: Iraq occupation will last 5 weeks or 5 months at most
"I can't tell you if the use of force in Iraq today would last five days, or five weeks, or five months, but it certainly isn't going to last any longer than that." --Donald Rumsfeld, November 14, 2002 "It could last six days, six weeks.
I doubt six months" -- Donald Rumsfeld, February 7, 2003 "I think it will go relatively quickly. Weeks rather than months." -- Dick Cheney, March 16, 2003 "No one is talking about occupying
Iraq for five to ten years." -- Richard Perle, March 9, 2003 "It could be that, absolutely." -- George W. Bush, when asked of the
United States would have troops in Iraq for the next ten years, January 11, 2008
Ridiculed Shinseki for saying Iraq needed greater manpower
Too few of the uniformed leaders of the American military spoke out against what many believed was a terribly flawed plan to go to war in Iraq. There were courageous exceptions. General Eric Shinseki, chief-of-staff of the Army, testified to
Congress that the military would need far greater manpower than we had planned for in order to achieve our objectives in Iraq. He was publicly humiliated by Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz, and left dangling and neutered over the last 12 months of his tenure.
Source: Our Next Chapter, by Chuck Hagel, p. 58-59
, Mar 25, 2008
Garner: key mistakes were disbanding army & deBaathification
On June 18, 2003, Jay Garner went to see Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld to report on his brief tenure in Iraq as head of the postwar planning office. “We’ve made three tragic decisions,” Jay Garner, the US envoy to Iraq, told Rumsfeld.
“Three terrible mistakes,” Garner said. He cited the first order banning as many as 50,000 members of Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party from government jobs and the second order disbanding the Iraqi military. Now there were hundreds of
thousands of disorganized, unemployed, armed Iraqis running around. Third, Garner said, was the summary dismissal of an interim Iraqi leadership group that had been eager to help the United States administer the country in the short term. Garner made his
final point: “There’s still time to rectify this. There’s still time to turn it around.”
Rumsfeld looked at Garner for a moment with his take-no-prisoners gaze. “Well,” he said, “I don’t think there is anything we can do, because we are where we are.”
Briefed on risks & dangers before war; but shut down dissent
A Feb. 2003 report identified “Show stoppers--problems, if not solved, place mission at risk”:
“Current force packages are inadequate for the 1st step of securing all the major urban areas. We risk letting much of the country descend into civil
“It seems likely we will begin military action before we know whether sufficient post-war funds will be available. We risk leaving behind a great unstable mess with potential to become a haven for terrorists.”
“The ideas, as briefed,
suggest a heavy-handed imperial take-over. Danger, danger!“
Tom Warrick, author of the related ‘Future of Iraq’ study, was transferred by Jay Garner from the State Department to the Pentagon as a result. A few days later, Rumsfeld said to
Garner, ”I’ve got to ask you to take Warrick off the team. I’ve gotten this request from such a high level that I can’t turn it down.“
A level so high that the secretary of defense couldn’t turn it down? That could only mean Bush or conceivably Cheney.
Infrastructure collapse was Saddam's fault, not U.S.
In 2003, Rumsfeld said, perhaps trying to refute Powell's warning that the US would own Iraq. "We will stay as long as necessary to help you do that--and not a day longer."
In an interview later, Rumsfeld said he realized that "the Iraqi infrastructure
had been neglected for decades. I went over and looked at an electric power plant. I can remember, it was being held together with chewing gum, bobby pins and baling wire. And I looked at [it] myself and said, My Lord, this took 30 years to get there."
Saddam had ruled for over 30 years. "It's going to take 30 years to get out of here, to get that--not us out--for them to get back to looking like Kuwait or Jordan or Saudi Arabia or Turkey or their neighbors. And I said, My goodness, that's going to be
their job over a long period of time, because it just takes that long. You can't--and they have wealth. They've got water. They've got oil. They've got industrious people. They clearly are going to be the ones that are going to have to do that."
1983: friendly talks with Saddam during his war with Iran
Iraq was at war with neighboring Iran, whose ruler [was] Ayatollah Khomeini. Shortly after Saddam's 1983 gassing of Iranian troops, President Reagan sent his Middle East envoy Donald Rumsfeld to hold friendly talks with Saddam. As Rumsfeld reported back
to Reagan, the meeting was a "positive milestone in development of US-Iraqi relations."
Rumsfeld was right. In the years afterward, the Reagan and HW Bush administrations authorized the sale to
Iraq of precursors to chemical and biological weapons, including anthrax and bubonic plague, as well as conventional weapons such as Chilean cluster bombs.
But all of that came to an abrupt end when, on August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. That put Saddam Hussein in control of 20% of the world's crude oil reserves. The love affair between the Republican right and the Baathist ultraright was over.
Rumsfeld says there are ties between Iraq & Al-Qaida
I have acknowledged since September 2002 that there were ties between al-Qaida and Iraq. This assessment was based upon points provided to me by [the] then CIA director George Tenet to describe the CIA’s understanding of the
al-Qaida Iraq relationship. Intelligence on the Saddam-al-Qaida question “migrates in amazing ways” and there were “many differences of opinion in the intelligence community”.
Source: Simon Jeffery, The Guardian, on Bush Cabinet
, Oct 5, 2004
1971: Focus on post-war Indochina peace & reconstruction
For nearly two months Rumsfeld had been seeking some new role in the administration through which he could influence the administration's policy on Vietnam. In the process, he had become a particular annoyance to Kissinger.
Rumsfeld's first attempt, in a memo to Nixon dated February 27, 1971, was to propose the appointment of "a high-level Presidential aide to review and report on postwar Southeast Asia during the winding down of hostilities."
The detailed paper left no doubt Rumsfeld had himself in mind for this job. The special envoy could lay the groundwork for postwar reconstruction of Southeast Asia, Rumsfeld argued; he insisted such an envoy would not intrude on
Kissinger's turf as national security adviser. Rumsfeld told Nixon that such an appointment "would focus attention and emphasis on Indo-China peace instead of Indo-China war." In bureaucratic language, Rumsfeld was asking Nixon to give peace a chance.
On January 26, 1998, President Clinton received a letter urging him to use his State of the Union address to declare the overthrow of Saddam Hussein to be the "aim if
American foreign policy" and to order "military action as diplomacy is failing." Should the president agree, the signers all pledged, they would "offer their full support in this difficult but necessary endeavor."
And, they warned, "the security of the world in the first part of the 21st century will be determined by how we handle this threat."
Signing the letter were Donald Rumsfeld [and other neoconservatives].
Four years before 9/11, they had publicly called for an invasion of Iraq, 9/11 would be the pretext for a war they had been devising for a decade.
In the first hours following the 9/11 attack, Paul Wolfowitz pushed the president to ignore Afghanistan and attack Iraq. On Sep. 12, when antiterror czar Richard Clark returned to the White House, he was jolted: "I expected to go back to a round of
meetings examining what the next attacks could be. Instead I walked into a series of discussions about Iraq. At first I was incredulous that we were talking about something other than getting Al Qaeda.
Then I realized with almost a sharp physical pain that Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were going to take advantage of this national tragedy to promote their agenda about Iraq. Since the beginning of the administration, indeed well before, they had been
pressing for a war with Iraq."
By afternoon, Rumsfeld was still going on about "getting Iraq." When Colin Powell urged that they focus on Al Qaeda, Rumsfeld pushed anew for the Iraq option.
Clarke: Rumsfeld took advantage of 9-11 to push Iraq agenda
I expected to go back to a round of meetings [after September 11] examining what the next attacks could be, what our vulnerabilities were, what we could do about them in the short term. Instead, I walked into a series of discussions about Iraq.
At first I was incredulous that we were talking about something other than getting Al Qaeda. Then I realized with almost a sharp physical pain that Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were going to try to take advantage of this national tragedy to promote their
agenda about Iraq. Since the beginning of the administration, indeed well before, they had been pressing for a war with Iraq.
On the morning of the 12th DOD’s focus was already beginning to shift from al Qaeda. CIA was explicit now that al Qaeda
was guilty of the attacks, but Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were not persuaded. It was too sophisticated and complicated an operation, they said, for a terrorist group to have pulled off by itself, without a state sponsor-Iraq must have been helping them.
By the afternoon on Wednesday [after Sept. 11], Secretary Rumsfeld was talking about broadening the objectives of our response and “getting Iraq.” Secretary Powell pushed back, urging a focus on al Qaeda. Relieved to have some support, I thanked Colin
Powell. “I thought I was missing something here,” I vented. “Having been attacked by al Qaeda, for us now to go bombing Iraq in response would be like our invading Mexico after the Japanese attacked us at Pearl Harbor.”
Powell shook his head. “It’s not
over yet.“ Indeed, it was not. Later in the day, Secy. Rumsfeld complained that there were no decent targets for bombing in Afghanistan and that we should consider bombing Iraq, which, he said, had better targets. At first I thought Rumsfeld was joking.
But he was serious and the President did not reject out of hand the idea of attacking Iraq. Instead, he noted that what we needed to do with Iraq was to change the government, not just hit it with more cruise missiles, as Rumsfeld had implied.
A meeting re Iraq. We went through the strategy for the next phase. [Colin] Powell's speech to the UN, then the next Blix report, [British Prime Minister Tony Blair] clear that he wanted to try to get Bush to a
second UN Security Council Resolution, pretty clear we couldn't do it without one. He felt we needed 2 or 3 Blix reports [from UN WMD inspector Hans Blix], and more time for Arab leaders to push Saddam out.
Rumsfeld was saying inside the administration that the problem with the UN route was that it was open-ended.
[UN inspector Hans] Blix, a former Swedish foreign minister, was from
2000-03 head of UNMOVIC, the successor body to UNSCOM. Both bodies were tasked with searching for WMD in Iraq and their removal under UN Security Council resolution.
Saddam’s goal was to end sanctions then restart WMD program
Key Findings: Regime Strategic Intent
Saddam Husayn so dominated the Iraqi Regime that its strategic intent was his alone. He wanted to end sanctions while preserving the capability to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
when sanctions were lifted.
The introduction of the Oil-For-Food program in late 1996 rescued Baghdad’s economy from a terminal decline created by sanctions. The Regime quickly came to see that OFF could be corrupted to acquire foreign exchange both
to further undermine sanctions and to provide the means to enhance dual-use infrastructure and potential WMD-related development.
The former Regime had no formal written strategy or plan for the revival of WMD after sanctions. Neither was there an
identifiable group of WMD policy makers or planners separate from Saddam. Instead, his lieutenants understood WMD revival was his goal from their long association with Saddam and his infrequent, but firm, verbal comments and directions to them.
Saddam’s focus for WMDs was tactical use on Iran & Israel
Key Findings: Regime Strategic Intent
Saddam wanted to recreate Iraq’s WMD capability-which was essentially destroyed in 1991-after sanctions were removed and Iraq’s economy stabilized, but probably with a different mix of capabilities
to that which previously existed. Saddam aspired to develop a nuclear capability but he intended to focus on ballistic missile and tactical chemical warfare (CW) capabilities.
Iran was the pre-eminent motivator of this policy. All senior level
Iraqi officials considered Iran to be Iraq’s principal enemy in the region. The wish to balance Israel and acquire status and influence in the Arab world were also considerations, but secondary.
In Saddam’s view, WMD helped to save the Regime
multiple times. He believed that during the Iran-Iraq war chemical weapons had halted Iranian ground offensives and that ballistic missile attacks on Tehran had broken its political will.
UN sanctions hurt Saddam militarily and politically
Key Findings: Regime Finance and Procurement
Saddam severely under-estimated the economic and military costs of invading Iran in 1980 and Kuwait in 1990, as well as underestimating the subsequent international condemnation of his
invasion of Kuwait. His initial belief was that UN sanctions would not last.
From Saddam’s perspective, UN sanctions hindered his ability to rule Iraq with complete authority and autonomy. According to Saddam and his senior advisors, the UN, at the
behest of the US, placed an economic strangle hold on Iraq.
UN sanctions curbed Saddam’s ability to import weapons, technology, and expertise into Iraq. Sanctions also limited his ability to finance his military & intelligence forces to deal with his
perceived and real external threats.
Saddam’s evolving strategy centered on breaking free of UN sanctions in order to liberate his economy from the economic strangle-hold so he could continue to pursue his political and personal objectives.
Saddam used Oil For Food program to bank $11 billion
Key Findings: Regime Finance and Procurement
Although Saddam had reluctantly accepted the UN’s Oil for Food (OFF) program by 1996, he soon recognized its economic value. Therefore, he resigned himself to the continuation of UN sanctions
understanding that they would become a “paper tiger” regardless of continued US resolve to maintain them.
Saddam circumvented the OFF program by means of “Protocols” or government-to-government economic trade agreements outside the purview of the UN.
The successful implementation of the Protocols, continued oil smuggling efforts, and the manipulation of UN OFF contracts emboldened Saddam to pursue his military reconstitution efforts starting in 1997 and peaking in 2001.
Once money began to flow
into Iraq, the Regime devised and implemented methods and techniques to procure illicit goods from foreign suppliers.
The Regime’s revenue streams amassed more that $11 billion from the early 1990s to 2030 outside the UN-approved methods.
1991 Desert Storm & UN sanctions destroyed Saddam’s missiles
Key Findings: Delivery Systems
Since the early 1970s, Iraq has consistently sought to acquire an effective long-range weapons delivery capability. The Soviet Union was a key supplier.
Desert Storm and subsequent UN resolutions and
inspections brought many of Iraq’s delivery system programs to a halt. While much of Iraq’s long-range missile inventory and production infrastructure was eliminated, Iraq until late 1991 kept some items hidden to assist future reconstitution of the
It appears to have taken time, but Iraq eventually realized that sanctions were not going to end quickly. This forced Iraq to sacrifice its long-range delivery force in an attempt to bring about a quick end to the sanctions.
The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) has uncovered no evidence Iraq retained Scud-variant missiles, and debriefings of Iraqi officials in addition to some documentation suggest that Iraq did not retain such missiles after 1991.
Saddam’s nuclear program decayed after Desert Storm
Key Findings: Nuclear
Iraq Survey Group (ISG) discovered further evidence of the maturity and significance of the pre-1991 Iraqi Nuclear Program but found that Iraq’s ability to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program progressively decayed
after that date.
Nevertheless, after 1991, Saddam did express his intent to retain the intellectual capital developed during the Iraqi Nuclear Program. Senior Iraqis-several of them from the Regime’s inner circle-told ISG they assumed Saddam would
restart a nuclear program once UN sanctions ended.
Baghdad undertook a variety of measures to conceal key elements of its nuclear program from successive UN inspectors, including specific direction by Saddam Husayn to hide and preserve documentation
associated with Iraq’s nuclear program.
As with other WMD areas, Saddam’s ambitions in the nuclear area were secondary to his prime objective of ending UN sanctions.
Saddam wanted chemical weapons but industry was destroyed
Key Findings: Chemical
Saddam never abandoned his intentions to resume a Chemical weapons effort when sanctions were lifted and conditions were judged favorable.
While a small number of old, abandoned chemical munitions have
been discovered, Iraq Survey Group (ISG) judges that Iraq unilaterally destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons stockpile in 1991.
Iraq’s CW program was crippled by the Gulf war and the legitimate chemical industry, which suffered under sanctions,
only began to recover in the mid-1990s. Subsequent changes in the management of key military and civilian organizations, followed by an influx of funding and resources, provided Iraq with the ability to reinvigorate its industrial base.
ISG found no credible evidence that any field elements knew about plans for CW use during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Saddam had biological weapons capability but no weapons
Key Findings: Biological
In 1991, Saddam Husayn regarded Biological Weapons (BW) as an integral element of his arsenal, and would have used it if the need arose.
Iraq Survey Group (ISG) judges that Iraq’s actions between 1991 and
1996 demonstrate that the state intended to preserve its BW capability and return to a steady, methodical progress toward a mature BW program when and if the opportunity arose.
ISG found no direct evidence that Iraq, after 1996, had plans for a new
BW program or was conducting BW-specific work for military purposes.
Iraq would have faced great difficulty in re-establishing an effective BW agent production capability. Nevertheless, after 1996 Iraq still had a significant dual-use capability-
some declared-readily useful for BW if the Regime chose to use it.
ISG judges that in 1991 and 1992, Iraq appears to have destroyed its undeclared stocks of BW weapons. However ISG lacks evidence to document complete destruction.
Extend international order friendly to our security.
Rumsfeld signed Project for the New American Century Statement of Principles
Conservatives have not confidently advanced a strategic vision of America's role in the world. We aim to change this. We aim to make the case and rally support for American global leadership.
As the 20th century draws to a close, the United States stands as the world's preeminent power. Having led the West to victory in the Cold War, America faces an opportunity and a challenge: Does the United States have the vision to build upon the achievements of past decades? Does the United States have the resolve to shape a new century favorable to American principles and interests? Our aim is to remind Americans of these lessons and to draw their consequences for today.
Here are four consequences:
we need to increase defense spending significantly if we are to carry out our global responsibilities today and modernize our armed forces for the future;
we need to strengthen our ties to democratic allies and to challenge regimes hostile to our interests and values;
we need to promote the cause of political and economic freedom abroad;
we need to accept responsibility for America's unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles.