Development assistance should support US objectives
The US Agency for International Development (USAID) had always considered its mission to be separate from and yet equal to that of the State Department. Development was thought to be a long-term process and--theoretically--free of political and strategic
motivations.
The problem was that the cultures of State and USAID were very different, the latter eschewing the idea that it was involved in "US foreign policy." That attitude, I was sure, would have come as a shock to taxpayers. I needed to make the
point that the US is not a nongovernmental organization. We can't simply focus on a single issue at the expense of others. I saw--and still see--nothing wrong with the proposition that development assistance ought to support broader US foreign policy
objectives.
US development assistance was critical in achieving the goals of democracy and good governance. Sometimes foreign assistance was for purely strategic purposes--but we wanted those cases to be the exception and not the rule.
In the Middle East the Arab Spring has freed millions. American can help to channel the development there in a positive direction. We have influence with the militaries in Egypt and Tunisia; with civil society and political activists, many of whom we've
helped train through America's nongovernmental institutions.
In other places, our friends--particularly the monarchs of the region--still have a chance to reform now before it's too late. The United States can coax these monarchies to adopt
constitutions and reforms that give greater voice to their people. The changes will strengthen moderate voices across the region. And to our enemies, the Syrian and Iranian regimes, we should say, "Your time has come.
Whatever follows you is unlikely to be worse, for your people and for the world, than who you have been."
Support democratic aspirations abroad, not just stability
I went to Cairo in June 2005 to deliver a speech on democracy in the Middle East. I knew that there was great skepticism about the US in this audience. Yet, as I spoke about our mistakes in supporting authoritarian regimes, the mood in the room shifted.
"For 60 years, my country pursued stability at the expense of democracy in this region here in the Middle East--and we have achieved neither," I said. "Now we are taking a difference course. We are supporting the democratic aspirations of all people."
At that moment and later with a group of democracy activists, I felt elated by the connection I'd made with Egypt's impatient patriots. Only later would I wonder if I'd unintentionally promised more rapid change than anyone could deliver, most
especially the US.
As I watched the increasingly isolated Hosni Mubarak struggling to hang on to power in Feb. 2011 while his people ridiculed him from the streets, I thought back on my speech at the American University in Cairo.
Be respectful but determined with China on human rights
The Chinese didn't appreciate our consistently raising human rights cases and the Tibetan issue, but they tolerated it. Even when the President met repeatedly with the Dalai Lama in the residence of the White House, the howls from Beijing were somewhat
muted. The protests increased when the President participated in the presentation of a Congressional Gold Medal to the Dalai Lama in 2007. But in relatively short order, the fit of pique subsided. In fact, we set the terms of engagement on these
difficult issues early: we vowed to be respectful but determined in challenging China on human rights. And we held fast to the belief that time was not on the side of authoritarianism in a country that was rapidly growing more prosperous.
We repeatedly told the Chinese that we believed that their economic growth was good for the international economy. They listened but probably ignored us when we said that it would be good for there to be a liberalization of Chinese politics, too.
Liberia is part of U.S. history; stay involved there
[Liberia President] Charles Taylor became intolerable, and the international community demanded the formation of a transitional government in Liberia in 2003.
The President wanted to know what his options were in dealing with the
Liberian crisis. "Why should I do something in Liberia?" he asked Colin and I.
"Because Liberia is ours," I replied. We talked about the history of the country that had been founded by freed American slaves. "Even the Liberian flag imitates the
Stars and Stripes," Colin added. I told the President that my Aunt Theresa had taught at the University of Liberia all the way back in 1961. The ties of the Africa American community to the country ran deep.
The President was determined to do something
about Liberia. The President reiterated that Taylor had to leave and said that the US would "participate with troops." In the face of international pressure and US resolve, Charles Taylor resigned the presidency of Liberia.
Post-WWII push for democratic institutions reflected values
After WWII, the Americans had a different view. There was a moral dimension to their insistence on democratic processes and institutions. But there was a practical reason a well: equate a new and stable order with a permanent change in the nature of the
defeated regimes, a change that could be secured only with democracy. They believed that the balance of power could be improved in our favor if democratic states emerged in Europe. This linking of our interests (the balance of power) and our values
(democracy) was at the core of our strategic thinking. Historically, it can be demonstrated that democracies have not fought one another. Therefore democracy and stability--both within states and between them--can be mutually reinforcing.
The belief in
the power of democracy to overcome old rivalries & establish a basis for peace & prosperity did not transfer verbatim to the Middle East. Still, the echoes of it were unmistakable in the way that we came to view that troubled region after 9/11.
In 2001, Amnesty International called the Uzbek government's "indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force." After the facts were uncovered, it was clear that the Uzbek authorities had confronted an effort intended to overthrow the local government.
The government's security forces and public affairs officials functioned poorly, but this was not a simple case of soldiers slaughtering innocents, as had been widely alleged and misreported.
My arguments did not prevail. At an NSC meeting, Condi
Rice responded to me by declaring, "Human rights trump security." I wondered if she had really thought that through. She seemed to be saying that if a country didn't behave as we did or as we expected, it would be shunned, even if turning it away from
us took a toll on our nation's security, and to make matters worse, it arrested their progress on human rights. "We made a clear choice, and that was to stand on the side of human rights," a senior State Department official echoed in the press.
Bush's views on foreign policy were one & the same as Rice's
Lacking a deep background in foreign policy, Bush counted on a team of foreign policy heavyweights with diverse expertise to help formulate policy based on his guiding principles, such as freedom, a strong military, and free trade.
Bush developed a strong personal bond with Rice and came to trust her judgment, instincts, and insights. As Hughes' and Bush's style and tone of communicating were one and the same, so too were Rice's and Bush's views on foreign policy.
Rice headed the group, referred to as the Vulcans. It included Richard Armitage (Colin Powell's alter ego), Paul Wolfowitz (protege of Dick Cheney), Richard Perle, and Bob Zoellick (a James Baker prot‚g‚). George Shultz was often called on for advice, an
once Dick Cheney became the vice presidential nominee, he too was directly involved. The name of the group was based on the imposing statue of Vulcan, the Roman god of fire and metalworking, that is a landmark in Rice's hometown of Birmingham, Alabama.
This is a transitional period for the Cuban people. We are going to stand with them for the proposition that there should not simply be the end of one dictatorship and the imposition of another dictatorship.
And we are working with partners in the international community to send that message very strongly. But our role will be to help the Cuban people when the time comes to have a peaceful and stable democratic transition.
Source: Free Cuba Foundation, on www.4condi.com, “Issues”
, Aug 6, 2006
Routine transatlantic relations good for business & people
Relations between Europeans and Americans are so multi-faceted that we have simply ceased to think about it any longer. Some people read it as a decline in transatlantic contacts. But if you just look at the raw numbers of contacts,
I doubt that there has been a decline, I think that there has been an acceleration. But it has become routine.
In any class that I teach at Stanford now probably some 10 or 15% comes from some place else, and a significant number from Europe.
The tendency of youth to think of themselves as, yes, holding citizenship [in one nation], but living here for five years, going and working there for three years, is probably the best thing we have going for us.
So I don’t despair about this at all, to say nothing of the business community where the ties and contacts are almost daily.
Source: TIES-Webzine interview at Hoover Institution, Stanford Univ.
, Jun 25, 2000
Redefine national interest, to avoid interest-based policy
Constituency-based politics, interest based politics, is having mostly a negative effect on foreign policy. Part of the problem here is that of having a clear view of the national interest.
It was so clear that when issues 1 through 10 all began and ended with the Soviet Union, it was a lot easier for the President to dominate foreign policy. Without a strong sense of what the national interest is,
foreign policy becomes a patchwork of interest group politics, like every other issue.
The change was utterly predictable [because] the Soviet Union was such an organizing principle. Americans saw every issue through the prism of Soviet Union.
Today it is just not true. So now the centripetal forces are very powerful in the absence of that centralizing principle. Hence we need a much more powerful definition of national interest.
Source: TIES-Webzine interview at Hoover Institution, Stanford Univ.
, Jun 25, 2000
Click here for definitions & background information on Foreign Policy.
