Ten Commandments of Statecraft: on Foreign Policy

Nixon’s Ten Commandments of Statecraft

A President needs a global view, a sense of proportion and a keen sense of the possible. If I could carve ten rules into the wall of the Oval Office for my successors in the dangerous years ahead, they would be these:
1. Always be prepared to negotiate, but never negotiate without being prepared
2. Never be belligerent, but always be firm
3. Always remember that covenants should be openly agreed to but privately negotiated
4. Never seek publicity that would destroy the ability to get results
5. Never give up unilaterally what could be used as a bargaining chip
6. Never let your adversary underestimate what you would do in response to a challenge
7. Always leave your adversary a face-saving line of retreat
8. Distinguish between friends who provide some human rights and enemies who deny all human rights
9. Do at least as much for our friends as our adversaries do for our enemies
10. Never lose faith. Faith without strength is futile, but strength without faith is streile.

Recommended quarantine of Cuba in 1960

By early 1960, Nixon recommended economic, political, and diplomatic isolation of Cuba. He added that "the time for patience was past," and that we should move vigorously in full association of our sister Latin American republics "to eradicate this cancer" in our hemisphere and "to prevent further Soviet penetration." "The Administration," said Nixon, was planning "a number of steps" and "will very promptly take the strongest possible economic measures to counter the economic banditry being practiced by this regime against our citizens."

1972 "Triangularization": USSR vs. USA vs. mainland China

Of course, he could have followed the example of the British and French, who recognized Red China and abandoned the Nationalist Chinese government in Taiwan. But such a move would mean canceling our defense treaties with Taiwan and implicitly endorsing Red China's claim to the island.

The genius of Nixon's negotiations enabled him to have his cake and eat it too. That is, he achieved "triangularization" without abandonment of US military support of Taiwan. With the carefully crafted phrases, "one China" and "peaceful resolution," Nixon gained a liaison office in Beijing. George Bush would be the 1st liaison officer of that mission in Beijing. This access to the People's Republic was a success that exceeded Nixon's greatest hopes.

1973: Egypt's Sadat represents future voice for moderation

Nixon believed that Sadat represented a future voice for moderation and restraint in the volatile Middle East. He prevented Israel from annihilating Sadat's army in order to preserve his leadership and thus the hope of a constructive peace settlement at a later time. For Sadat, the preservation of his army was a "face-saving line of retreat." But for the world, it was the foundation for the Egyptian-Israeli accord a few years later.

Economic liberty mounts pressure to open up China

Second, Nixon was implicitly arguing that a free market economy, which both South Vietnam and South Korea were encouraging, was a basic freedom totalitarian Marxism did not recognize. It was Nixon's belief that economic liberty, even if under autocratic governments, generated mounting pressure to open up society. In other words, if economic freedom comes, it is usually soon followed by political freedom. Nixon would cite Chile, Taiwan, and Singapore, as well as South Korea, as evidence.