George W. Bush in State of Denial, by Bob Woodward


On Foreign Policy: 2001 secret China meeting: backed off from defending Taiwan

On April 25, 2001, ABC television asked Bush whether the US had an obligation to defend Taiwan.

"Yes, we do. And the Chinese must understand that," Bush replied.

"And you would..."

"Yes, I would."

"With the full force of the American military?"

"Whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself."

It was one of the strongest statements the US had made about the delicate issue of Taiwan. The Chinese were very upset.

How do I get out of this? Bush essentially asked. After listening to [adviser Brent] Scowcroft, Bush asked him to go on a secret mission to China to meet with President Jiang Zemin and explain US policy. Scowcroft told the Chinese leader that Bush's policy was to defend Taiwan if the island was attacked unprovoked, but if the Taiwanese took action to change the status quo on their own, the US would not defend them. Jiang and Bush seemed satisfied, and Scowcroft's secret mission never became public.

Source: State of Denial, by Bob Woodward, p. 33 Oct 1, 2006

On Homeland Security: Committed in 1999 to military buildup

A big job for the next president was figuring out the purpose of American foreign policy. In 1999, Bush attended 5 meetings with various Vulcans [of Condi Rice's team].

At the 1st Vulcan meeting in February 1999, Bush asked, "Is defense to be an issue in the 2000 campaign?" The advisers said they didn't think it would. Bush said he wanted to make defense an issue. He said he wanted to transform the military, to put it in a position to deal with new & emerging threats.

To do that, the advisers said, the military would need new equipment. Bush indicated he was willing to make that investment. Bush gave a speech at The Citadel in Sept: 1999: "I will defend the American people against missiles and terror," Bush said, "And I will begin creating the military of the next century. Homeland defense has become an urgent duty." He cited the potential "threat of biological, chemical and nuclear terrorism. Every group or nation must know, if they sponsor such attacks, our response will be devastating."

Source: State of Denial, by Bob Woodward, p. 7-8 Oct 1, 2006

On Principles & Values: I'm not a textbook player; I'm a gut player

At a meeting during Bush's early candidacy, the Vulcans [Condi Rice's policy team] were discussing arms control. Bush had lots of questions and he was getting lots of answers. [One advisor] told Bush, "They're very good on this stuff. You don't need all the technical stuff. You've got great instincts. If I could urge you to do one thing, it would be 'Trust your instincts.'"

Bush had no problem trusting his instincts. It was almost his second religion. In an interview with me several years later, on August 20, 2002, he referred a dozen times to his "instincts" or his "instinctive" reactions as the guide for his decisions. At one point he said, "I'm not a textbook player, I'm a gut player."

Source: State of Denial, by Bob Woodward, p. 11 Oct 1, 2006

On Principles & Values: Catalyst for presidency was father's loss to Bill Clinton

"I think Bush came into office with a mission," Saudi Prince Bandar said. "Many people are confusing it with his faith--religious faith. I think he had a mission that is agnostic. That he was convinced that the mission had to be achieved and that he is the only one who is going to achieve it. And it started with: Injustice has been done to a good man, George Herbert Walker Bush, a man who was a hero, who served his country, who did everything right." Then as president, his father went to war in 1991 to oust Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. "And he wins," Bandar continued, "and a charlatan--in his mind--draft dodger, etc., beats him. There is no justice."

Clinton's victory in 1992 was the catalyst. "So from 1992, this young man who was a wild young man in his youth, matured, but with a focus on one mission. There's injustice. There's something not right. I am going to correct it."

Source: State of Denial, by Bob Woodward, p. 13-4 Oct 1, 2006

On War & Peace: OpEd: Bush's lack of doubt meant more men fell for "honor"

Powell and Armitage engaged in a private, running commentary about Bush, Cheney, and what was really going on. Both wanted Bush to succeed, and they believed the Iraq War had to be won. "Don't they have moments of self-doubt?" Armitage asked Powell one day.

Powell said he had the same question. If you don't have self doubt, Powell said, if you didn't get up in the morning wondering if you're doing a good job, you're not worth much.

But doubt never seeped into the president's public rhetoric. And as far as Powell's and Armitage's experience went, he was the same in private. "What the president says in effect is we've got to press on in honor of the memory of those who have fallen. Another way to say that is we've got to have more men fall to honor the memories of those who have already fallen."

I had explored the issue of doubt with Bush in several interviews. He volunteered the following: "I have not doubted what we're doing. There is no doubt in my mind we're doing the right thing."

Source: State of Denial, by Bob Woodward, p. 325 Oct 1, 2006

On War & Peace: Decision to invade Iraq was certain by fall 2002

In the fall of 2002, CIA chief George Tenet and Bush had a 30-second conversation in which Bush made it clear that war with Iraq was necessary and inevitable. Tenet was extremely surprised, but the president’s short remarks were made with such conviction that Tenet suddenly realized they were on a march to war. All the war planning had a specific purpose. Bush said that the risks presented by Saddam would grow with time. “We’re not going to wait,” he said.

One CIA analyst asked Tenet if it really looked like war. “You bet,” Tenet said bluntly. “It’s not a matter of if. It’s a matter of when. This president is going to war. Make the plans. We’re going.”

Tenet didn’t think that invading Iraq was the right thing to do. But Tenet never conveyed these misgivings to the president. Bush had never asked him directly for his bottom-line counsel, although Tenet felt that Bush had nonetheless opened the door to the point where Tenet could have said, “No, we shouldn’t do this.” But Tenet never said it.

Source: State of Denial, by Bob Woodward, p. 89-90&106 Oct 1, 2006

On War & Peace: 2002 NIE said Saddam making nukes by 2007; Bush said 2002

Bush was to give a speech on Oct. 7 2002 spelling out the case against Saddam. The CIA kept tabs on what Bush was going to say, and at one point realized that Bush planned to nake an alarming claim about a potential Saddam nuclear program, by charging that Iraq had been caught trying to buy uranium oxide in Africa.

“You need to take this sentence out because we don’t believe it,” CIA Directot Geroge Tenet said to Bush’s aide. The speech was edited to say “Many people have asked how close Saddam is to developing a nuclear weapon. We don’t know exactly, and that’s the problem.“ It was a modest claim that accurately reflected the National Intelligence Estimate. The to psecret NIE said that ”Iraq does not have a nuclear weapon but is likely to have a weapon by 2007 to 2009.“

But instead of saying that a nuclear Iraq was 5 years off, Bush warned, ”Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof--the smoking gun--that would come in the form of a mushroom cloud.“

Source: State of Denial, by Bob Woodward, p. 97 Oct 1, 2006

On War & Peace: Post-war planning began in Jan.'03, including governing

On 1/20/2003, Bush signed a secret directive, NSPD-24. The subject: setting up an "Iraq Postwar Planning Office" within the Defense Department: "The US will want to be in a position to help meet the humanitarian, reconstruction, and administration challenges facing the country in the immediate aftermath of the combat operations."
    The presidential directive gave responsibility for all the tasks normally run by national, state and local governments in post-Saddam Iraq. The list included:
  1. Assisting with humanitarian relief
  2. Dismantling weapons of mass destruction
  3. Defeating and exploiting terrorist networks
  4. Protecting natural resources and infrastructure
  5. Facilitating the country's reconstruction and protection of its infrastructure and economy
  6. Assisting with the reestablishment of key civilian utilities
  7. Reshaping the Iraqi military
  8. Reshaping the other internal security institutions; and
  9. Supporting the transition to Iraqi-led authority over time.
Source: State of Denial, by Bob Woodward, p.112 Oct 1, 2006

On War & Peace: Claimed 946 WMD sites “known”; none found

[After the invasion of Iraq, the US forces began searching for WMD, based on a list of 946 suspected sites known as the WMDMSL, or Weapons of Mass Destruction Master Site List. One analyst said], “946 sites! They couldn’t be wrong about all of them, could they?” But so far there had been no WMD stockpiles found.

Then on May 29, Bush declared, “We have found the WMD. We found biological laboratories. They’re illegal. They’re against the UN resolutions, and we’ve so far discovered two. And we’ll find more weapons as time goes on. But for those who say we haven’t found the banned manufacturing devices or banned weapons, they’re wrong. We found them.“

Bush made similar remarks in other interviews. The only problem was that the weapons hadn’t actually been found. Despite a series of highly publicized false positives, each time the military found a smoking gun--an alleged stockpile, a vat or even a small vial of biological weapons--it would soon be discredited.

Source: State of Denial, by Bob Woodward, p.160&209-210 Oct 1, 2006

On War & Peace: Saudis recommended paying Iraq Army; Bush declined

In April 2003, [Saudi Arabia's] Prince Bandar went to the White House. Bandar expressed concern about stability in Iraq to Bush. "Take the top echelon off because of their involvement and their bloody hands," Bandar said. "But keep the colonels on down. Somebody has to run things."
  • Saudi Arabia shared a 500-mile border with Iraq, and stability in the aftermath was a major concern. The Saudis estimated that there were some 3 million retirees in Iraq, sitting at home, getting about the equivalent of $6 a month. "Go and pay them for 6 months, for God's sakes," Bandar advised. "Each of them supports a family, mind you. So from 3 million you could get the support of literally 10 million people. Suddenly you have a major constituency for you because you have paid them off."
  • It was the Saudi way. Paying 3 million retirees would amount to about $100 million. Bandar proposed doing the same with the Iraqi military. [Bush and Rumsfeld declined to pay the Iraqi military or retirees.]
    Source: State of Denial, by Bob Woodward, p.163 Oct 1, 2006

    On War & Peace: Kay Report: WMDs never existed; hence WMD-related activities

    David Kay gave an interim report on Iraqi WMDs to Congress in Oct. 2003. “We have not yet found stocks of weapons,” Kay said, but said he had found “dozens of WMD-related program activities.” In essence, Kay was trying to have it both ways: No stockpiles had been found but they might someday be found.

    In his state of the union speech in Jan.2004, Bush did not refer to “WMD,” but to “weapons of mass destruction related program activities.” Kay urged others to follow the president’s lead, to stop talking about WMD, and to stop building a case for the Iraq war based on the actual weapons, “because you’re not going to find that.”

    “I don’t think they existed,” Kay said when asked about the WMD. “We were almost all wrong, and I certainly include myself. It is important to acknowledge failure.”

    How did US intelligence miss all this? “We missed it because the Iraqis actually behaved like they had weapons,” Kay said. Saddam didn’t have WMD but wanted to appear as if he did. His purpose was deception.

    Source: State of Denial, by Bob Woodward, p.258&277-278 Oct 1, 2006

    On War & Peace: CIA’s Tenet considered “slam dunk” his dumbest 2 words ever

    In April 2004, Plan of Attack was published, reporting that three months before the war, CIA Director George Tenet had twice told the president that the intelligence case on Iraq’s WMD was a “slam dunk.” Tenet later claimed he did not remember saying “slam dunk,” though he did not dispute it. He asserted that the meeting was to determine what intelligence could be made public to “market” the case for war, as reported in Plan of Attack.

    But a public case for war could hardly be a “slam dunk“ if the CIA Director did not believe that the underlying intelligence was also a ”slam dunk.“ Obviously, Tenet had believed it was, based on the NIE of three months earlier. Tenet has a strong case when he asserts that his ”slam dunk“ assertion did not cause the president to decide on war. Tenet believes Bush had already made the decision.

    In 2005, Tenet was asked publicly about the ”slam dunk“ comment. ”Those are the two dumbest words I ever said,“ h replied.

    Source: State of Denial, by Bob Woodward, p.303-304 Oct 1, 2006

    The above quotations are from State of Denial:
    Bush at War, Part III    , by Bob Woodward.
    Click here for other excerpts from State of Denial:
    Bush at War, Part III    , by Bob Woodward    .
    Click here for other excerpts by George W. Bush.
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